The presidential elections in Russia in May 2024 were followed by a planned reshuffle and redistribution of powers in the Government, federal government agencies and the Presidential Executive Office.

The new Cabinet (and other bodies) consists of essentially two separate blocs: the “civilian” bloc and the “military-industrial” bloc thereby creating space for these blocs’ supervisors
competing for the leading role in managing the economy.

These reshuffles show that experienced top leadership contenders (former Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu, Deputy Chair of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev, Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin, etc.) did not expand their influence or were even moved to less important offices.

At the same time, there is an attempt of “gentle testing” of new candidates for top leadership positions (in the 40–55-year-old age cohort): Boris Kovalchuk is confirmed as the Head of the Accounts Chamber, Denis Manturov is promoted to the First Deputy Prime Minister, the Tula Region Governor appointed as Presidential aide, etc. These reshuffles cannot yet, however, be assessed with a view to the long-term prospects for personal power dynamics and continuity.

Other important changes include introducing a “matrix” approach to managing national projects, installing a new “civilian” defence minister, weakening the Cabinet’s social bloc, etc.

The reshuffles reflect changes that affect businesses: bolstering the ideological component in IT & tech sector, sustaining the trend toward “nationalizing” strategic assets, mobilizing budget revenues, etc.

A detailed analytical memo describing details on these and other consequences of the reshuffles is available in Russian and in English by request: marketing@kesarev.com